The Failure of Burmese Democratization

It is said that young democracies exhibit more belligerent traits as opposed to mature democracies. Myanmar is a testimony to this fact. Political reforms and economic growth have not come as easily to Myanmar as in the case of other Southeast Asian countries.

The latest development in the country’s politics and increased military repression has not only subverted democratic advances but destabilized their foundation. This has raised fears of the international community and the Burmese population as the future prospects of democratization lay in jeopardy. However, a deeper insight into Myanmar’s democratization reveals that the reforms set in motion by Su Kyi’s government were always going to fall short of democratic governance anyway. Despite the military relinquishing a degree of its control and creating the illusion of handing over power, in reality military power and interests continued to be of paramount importance in the country’s politics.

Democratic governance must invoke respect for human rights, political freedom and opportunity, minority representation, and stability. However, none of these features have manifested themselves in Myanmar despite attempts to transfer power to a civilian government. This is primarily due to military control, ethnic conflict, and poor leadership.

To be fair, Thein Sein’s civilian government did make efforts towards democratization. For instance,

Thein Sein liberalized political space for civil society and tried to improve relations with Aung San

Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) (Hlaing 2012, p. 206).

Government newspapers dropped government propaganda and officials welcomed Suu Kyi to join the

Parliament even though she was barred from contestation previously (Hlaing 2012, p. 206). Sein’s

government also amended electoral laws to allow the NLD and Suu Kyi to contest in the elections

(Hlaing 2012, p. 207). Resultantly, Suu Kyi won a landslide victory in the 2012 and 2015 elections.

However, these attempts were insufficient to transform a country ravaged by authoritarianism. The

reforms did not address the crux of Myanmar’s problems but were motivated by the military to serve

its interests in the name of democratization. One of the major reasons for democratic failure

is the institutionalised role of the military and the privileges it enjoys. Consider the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. As per this Constitution, any major amendment requires the support of 75% of the Parliament and a national referendum (Zin & Joseph 2012, p. 112). However, the constitution also reserves 25% of the seats in Parliament for military elites (Myoe 2014 p. 8). These elites have followed a pattern of blocking democratic bills which inevitably threaten their power. This not only undermines the work of democratic forces but also makes it difficult to accomplish anything due to frequent deadlocks. A democracy cannot work if the non-elected elite enjoys veto over the elected representatives.

It is not only the military’s institutionalised control but also military privileges embedded in the

system which undermines the democratic tenet of equal political opportunity. In 2014, 60 out of 101

Union ministers and 13 out of 14 chief ministers have military backgrounds (Myoe 2014 p. 15).

Additionally, over 80% of the directors in the civil service enjoy military affiliation (Myoe 2014 p.

15). This makes the removal of military from politics impossible and enforces the idea that military

affiliation brings incentives not offered by democratic parties.

The second reason for democratic failure is the poor performance of the NPD and Suu Kyi’s fall from

grace. Most states succeed in democratization either due to elites’ ability to compromise or due to the

presence of a strong leadership. Both are absent in Myanmar. Suu Kyi rose to popularity by rallying in favour of press freedom, inclusivity, human rights and democracy in Myanmar but her government has failed to deliver on most accounts. One of the tenets of democracy is the dispersion of power. However, after her electoral victory in 2015, Suu Kyi moved to centralize power by assuming the roles of State Counsellor, Foreign Minister and membership of several Councils. This was worsened by her ‘unwillingness to delegate’ and conferring important duties only on members of her ‘inner circle’ (Thawnghmung & Robinson 2017, p. 243).

Another indication of democracy is accountability to the people and freedom of expression. However,

the NLD proposed the ‘State Councillor Bill’ in Parliament allowing Suu Kyi to escape constitutional

restrictions on her role (Thawnghmung &; Robinson 2017, p. 239). Additionally, her administration

became unpopular for jailing critics leading many to believe that Suu Kyi and NLD were ‘too much of

the same.’ For instance, in 2016 the Chief Executive of the Eleven Media Group and several

journalists were arrested on ambiguous grounds (Thawnghmung &; Robinson 2017, p. 241).

Moreover, she retained ministries that were used by the military to exercise control by monitoring

private information. For instance, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, important for minority

representation, was stripped to ‘save costs’ but the Ministry of Information, notorious for violating civil

liberties, was not expelled (Thawnghmung &; Robinson 2017, p. 241). The Rohingya Crisis preceded

by genocide struck the final blow to Suu Kyi’s legitimacy as a democratic leader.

Another hallmark of democracy is the guarantee of equal rights, liberties and representation.

However, the NLD-led administration has failed to include ethnic minorities in national political

processes and sustain ceasefires to end insurgencies. Post 2012, the NLD made attempts to negotiate

ceasefires with ethnic regions with partial success. However, negotiations with the Arakan National

Party (ANP) and Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) were complicated (Thawnghmung &; Robinson 2017, p. 244). While members of other ethnicities were appointed to administrative

positions, ANP and SNLD candidates were rejected. Moreover, there was more talk and little change

in policies when it came to addressing the issue. Consequently, conflict intensified with four armed

groups waging violence in Shan, Rakhine and Kachin states (Thawnghmung &; Robinson 2017, p.

245). This brought military retaliation, human rights abuses and indicated that despite efforts to

concentrate power, Suu Kyi had no real control.

This failure of democratization is indicated by the ground reality in Myanmar. As per the EIU

Democracy Index, Myanmar’s rank has fallen to 122nd out of 167 countries (The Economist, 2019).

Myanmar’s abysmal human rights record has led Amnesty International to label Suu Kyi a ‘profound

disappointment’ (Ellis-Peterson, 2018).

Conclusively, systemic changes are needed in Myanmar to ensure democracy and stability. Elites

must be convinced to comprise political power whilst maintaining some corporate interests. A lesson

can be drawn from Indonesia’s democratic transition from 1998 to 2019. Secondly, policies based on

assimilation should be pursued to include ethnic minorities and terminate violence (Holliday 2010, p.

115). Moreover, major amendments are needed in the Constitution to enforce accountability, equality

and fair competition. Lastly, Myanmar must tend to its wounded national reputation in order to

engage the West and overcome its current impoverished state.

Further Readings

“Democracy Index 2019” The Economist: Intelligence Unit. 2019. Available at http://country.eiu.com/myanmar. (Accessed 23 May 2020).

Ellis-Peterson, H., 2018. From Peace Icon to Pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi’s fall from grace. The Guardian, 23rd November. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar. (Accessed 23 May 2020).

Hlaing, K.Y., 2012. Understanding recent political changes in Myanmar. Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp.197-216.

Holliday, I., 2010. Voting and violence in Myanmar: nation building for a transition to democracy. In Burma Or Myanmar? The Struggle For National Identity (pp. 23-49).

Kundu, S., 2012. Myanmar: Pangs of democratic transition. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, 130.

“Migration casts minorities to the margins as citizenship law denies legal identity,” The Guardian. 3rd November 2016. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/nov/03/myanmar-casts-minorities-to-margins-citizenship-law-denies-legal-identity. (Accessed on 23 May 2020).

Myoe, M.A., 2014. The soldier and the state: the Tatmadaw and political liberalization in Myanmar since 2011. South East Asia Research, 22(2), pp.233-249.

Thawnghmung, A.M. and Robinson, G., 2017. MYANMAR’S NEW ERA: A Break from the Past, or Too Much of the Same?. Southeast Asian Affairs, pp.237-258.

Zin, M. and Joseph, B., 2012. The Opening in Burma: The Democrats' Opportunity. Journal of Democracy, 23(4), pp.104-119.

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